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IMPOSSIBLE
LARRY ALEXANDER*
Fred Schauer says that there are domains of constitutional doctrine that
are too hard for theorists to resolve. He's right about that. He identifies the
unconstitutional conditions metadoctrine as one within that "too hard" domain.
He's right about that, too. Moreover, he's right about many of the other "too
hard" doctrines he identifies.
What I intend to do in my comments on Fred's paper then is not to dis-
agree with him in any important way, for I think his analysis is substantially
correct. Rather, I intend to try to provide a theoretical account of why there
cannot be satisfactory theoretical accounts of certain doctrinal areas. I hope
that even if Fred is correct, and the various constitutional doctrines he discuss-
es cannot be justified theoretically, at least there can be a theoretical explana-
tion for why he is correct.
I shall start with the easiest area, the Dormant Commerce Clause. The
Bacchus' case was useful for me for several years-and the West Lynn
Creamery2 case is even better-in raising for my students the question how
can you tell the difference between a discriminatory tax (or regulation) and a
discriminatory subsidy. Orthodox Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has it
that the former is unconstitutional while the latter is constitutionally permis-
sible. If the former were permissible, nothing would be left of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, at least as it applies to state protectionism. If the lat-
ter-subsidies-were unconstitutional, little sense would remain of the idea of
separate states with particular concern for their own citizens' welfare.3
But how draw the line between illegitimate tax and regulatory discrimina-
tion on the one hand, and legitimate subsidy on the other? What Bacchus and
West Lynn show is that it can't be done. Moreover, all state interferences with
the market designed to benefit local producers or consumers display the same
economic vices: they shift wealth from out-of-staters and the general mass of
in-staters to a smaller and usually better organized group of in-staters, so that
not only are competing states beggared, but so too is the protectionist state
overall. Moreover, in these respects, protectionist state regulations do not
differ from many non-discriminatory state regulations of the economy. A
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. B.A., Williams Col-
lege, 1965; LL.B., Yale School of Law, 1968. This is the written version of a contribution to a
symposium on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine held at the University of Denver College of
Law on March 17-18, 1995.
1. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
2. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
3. See Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv.
487, 490-92, 530-49 (1981).
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desire to reward Minnesota's timber industry by banning plastic milk con-
tainers will have the same bad effects on Minnesota whether the plastics in-
dustry is largely out-of-state or is exclusively in-state.4
Now I think it is easy to explain why the Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence has come a'cropper this way. I think that it has done so because
it is a doctrine that never should have existed. I agree with Justice Scalia and
his academic allies who argue that the Commerce Clause is not a direct limita-
tion on state power.' The Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is a constitu-
tional oxymoron. And if it tries to move beyond the narrow area of state ex-
ploitation of geographical location in order to extract rents from interstate
commerce and into the area of state protectionism, it will run headlong into
West Lynn and Bacchus, which it has.
The theoretical explanations of other "too hard" doctrines are different.
Before turning to unconstitutional conditions, I would like to mention a couple
of my favorite examples of "too hard" doctrines: the religion clauses and equal
protection.
The religion clauses are, I think, one of the Constitution's "grim jokes."
One cannot come up with a principled way of granting free exercise exemp-
tions from regulation without at some point engaging in assessing the truth or
falsity of religious doctrine, the very thing the Establishment Clause must
forbid if it forbids anything.6 Although every constitutional theorist alludes to
the "tension" between the religion clauses, in fact the relation is not one of
tension but of outright contradiction. Indeed, at a deep theoretical level, I think
it can be shown that there cannot be a neutral, nonsectarian vantage point from
which to assess sectarian claims.7
(Of course, some constitutional scholars contend the religion clauses were
meant to serve only as statements that the federal government had no power to
regulate in the area of religion! They, like Scalia and others regarding the
Dormant Commerce Clause, believe that the modem, rights-oriented view of
the clauses is illegitimate, and that the doctrinal disarray is traceable to the
misstep of not recognizing this.)
Equal protection is another constitutional grim joke. Again, it would not
be so if it were a narrow rule that perhaps did nothing more than demand the
repeal of the Black Codes. As a general mandate that classifications be "justi-
fied," however, it looks outward to some moral theory to give an account of
such justification. And moral theory is imperialistic. By that I mean that moral
theory provides a complete blueprint for governmental action, one that leaves
4. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
5. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 202 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitution-
al Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569.
6. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience:
The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CII]. L. REV. 1245, 1254-70
(1994).
7. See Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIE-
Go L. REv. 763, 793-94 (1993).
8. See STEvEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE 17-26, 119 (1995).
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little if any room for discretion, politics, etc., and no room for treating benefits
as "optional"-that is, capable of being leveled up or leveled down.9 But
equal protection doctrine assumes that the benefits it is concerned with are
optional. And it assumes as well that the justifications for classifications do
not make the rest of the Constitution otiose. Yet, justifications that look be-
yond the Constitution's text to morality obey no such constraints.
I conclude with the area of unconstitutional conditions. Although some
parts of the metadoctrine may be theoretically explicable-I think, for exam-
ple, Tom Merrill's "public goods" theory does a nice job in a limited
domain'°--I think Fred Schauer is correct that larger portions of the area, and
particularly large portions of conditions on free speech, cannot be theoretically
rationalized. I focus particularly on the areas of government speech and gov-
ernment employment, or Rust" and Pickering2 for short. The discussion of
these areas of free speech applies more generally, however, to the intersection
of the optional benefits of the modem affirmative state and the classical liberal
rights of speech, religion, and privacy. It is particularly applicable to
Rosenberger3 and to vouchers and other aid for religious schools.
These areas exhibit a fundamental theoretical contradiction characteristic
of liberalism, at bottom the same one that I mentioned in connection with the
religion clauses. Freedom of speech at its core mandates governmental neutral-
ity with respect to the content of speech. (What would freedom of speech be
without content neutrality?) And the religion clauses are thought to require a
similar governmental neutrality with respect to religion. Darwinism and Cre-
ationism, round Earth theories and flat Earth theories, support for Clinton and
opposition to Clinton-all can be expressed without penalty.
On the other hand, government cannot run educational systems-or for
that matter, anything else-without taking sides on such issues.' It cannot
warn of the dangers of AIDS and then turn around and gainsay that warning,
as private citizens arguably have a right to do. It cannot counsel live birth and
abortion. And President Clinton surely has a right to require his aides to keep
any unflattering opinions they have of him to themselves on pain of losing
their jobs, as school boards have a right to refuse to hire exponents of peder-
asty as school teachers.
In short, the government, whenever it acts, acts in a partisan way. Indeed,
I would assert-to bring the earlier discussion of religion more squarely back
into play-that government, whenever it acts, acts in a sectarian way. The
justifications it provides for infringing liberties are always of the same form:
not impinging these liberties would trample on other people's values, values
9. See Larry Alexander, Constitutional Theory and Constitutionally Optional Benefits and
Burdens, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 287 (1994).
10. See Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard:'Constitutional Rights as Public Goods,
72 DENy. U. L. REV. 859 (1995).
11. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
12. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
13. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
14. See Larry Alexander, Understanding Constitutional Rights in a World of Optional
Baselines, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175 (1989).
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which we, the government, believe trump the liberties. That view is inescap-
ably partisan. Therefore, if the Constitution-a liberal document-demands
governmental neutrality with respect to ideas, religious and secular, then the
Constitution is a grim joke as a theoretical manner.
There is another reason why the unconstitutional conditions metadoctrine
is such a mess, a reason that ties into my earlier discussion of equal protection
and, indeed, into many areas of constitutional law. The Constitution has in-
creasingly come to be viewed, not as a list of fixed, determinate rules, but as a
source of heavily moralized "principles." The various terms that our constitu-
tional vocabulary employs--"legitimacy" and "compellingness" of state inter-
est for example-invoke morality. Yet, as I said in connection with equal pro-
tection, morality is imperialistic. There is no reason to think that what morality
demands can be severed into distinct principles that correlate with the discrete
provisions of the Constitution, or even that posited norms that constitute what
the Constitution is correspond perfectly with what morality prescribes ought to
be. Indeed, it is probably only our fervent desire that what the Constitution is,
is what, in our opinion, it ought to be, that leads us to view it as a repository
for Dworkinian principles and not as a set of narrower and only partially rec-
oncilable rules. 5
Yet, decide cases we must, and so we shall. Just don't ask for a theoreti-
cal justification of our decisions. Not only is that too hard, it's impossible.
15. See generally Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, in LAW AND
INTERPRETAnON 279-327 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995).
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